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JUST A SOUL WHOSE INTENTIONS ARE GOOD? 
THE RELEVANCE OF A DEFENDANT’S 
SUBJECTIVE INTENT IN DEFINING A 
“DESTRUCTIVE DEVICE” UNDER THE 
NATIONAL FIREARMS ACT 
Elliot Buckman* 
 
This Note addresses the three-way circuit split among the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals over when, and to what extent, a court may consider a defendant’s 
subjective intent in defining a “destructive device” under the National 
Firearms Act.  The circuit split centers on the Act’s ambiguous reference to 
intent in its definition of a destructive device, which is a statutorily 
prohibited firearm.  After discussing the Act’s legislative history and 
development, this Note considers the role of mens rea in National Firearms 
Act cases.  It next addresses the disagreement among the Courts of Appeals, 
first detailing three cases that give rise to the disagreement and then 
discussing additional cases which support each position.  Finally, this Note 
argues that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s view, 
espousing a generally objective approach and eschewing a consideration of 
a defendant’s intent outside of a small range of cases, is most consistent 
with legislative history, statutory interpretation, and common sense. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Aaron Spoerke enjoyed detonating homemade pipe bombs underwater.1  
He did so not to injure anyone, but because he appreciated seeing “a flash 
underwater” and feeling “a concussion” that resulted from exploding these 
devices.2  On the basis of his intention to use the pipe bombs for innocuous 
purposes, Spoerke challenged his conviction3 for making and possessing a 
destructive device under the National Firearms Act,4 which defines 
“destructive device” as: 
1) any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas (A) bomb, (B) grenade, (C) 
rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces, (D) missile 
having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce, 
(E) mine, or (F) similar device; (2) any type of weapon by whatever name 
known which will, or which may be readily converted to, expel a 
projectile by the action of an explosive or other propellant, the barrel or 
barrels of which have a bore of more than one-half inch in diameter, 
except a shotgun or shotgun shell which the Secretary finds is generally 
recognized as particularly suitable for sporting purposes; and (3) any 
combination of parts either designed or intended for use in converting any 
device into a destructive device as defined in subparagraphs (1) and (2) 
and from which a destructive device may be readily assembled. The term 
 
 1. United States v. Spoerke, 568 F.3d 1236, 1243 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See id. at 1247. 
 4. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801–72 (2006). 
2010] JUST A SOUL WHOSE INTENTIONS ARE GOOD?  565 
“destructive device” shall not include any device which is neither 
designed nor redesigned for use as a weapon . . . .5 
In its discussion of the possible import of Spoerke’s subjective intent in 
determining whether the device at hand was a statutorily “destructive” one, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit noted a three-way circuit 
split on this issue.6  Much of the debate hinges on the appropriate 
interpretation of the statute’s use of the word “intended”;7 specifically, 
whether—and to what extent—a defendant’s subjective intent may inform 
the final determination as to whether a device is “destructive.”  Though the 
views of the circuit courts are elucidated in far greater detail in Part II of 
this Note, a brief overview of the three opinions cited in Spoerke8 is 
presented now. 
In United States v. Oba,9 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
afforded supreme weight to a defendant’s subjective intent, stating that “a 
device may be ‘converted’ into a destructive device as defined in 
subparagraphs (1) and (2) by way of ‘design or intent.’”10  According to the 
Oba court, even if the item in question would not, by virtue of its objective 
characteristics, come within the ambit of subparagraphs (1) or (2), a 
defendant’s intent to use that item for a destructive purpose11 can 
effectively place it within the Act’s reach.12 
In United States v. Posnjak,13 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit stated that generally speaking, a defendant’s subjective intent may 
not render “destructive” a device that otherwise would not fall under 26 
U.S.C. § 5845(f).14  The court held that it is the objective nature of a device, 
and not its user’s intention, which determines whether or not the statute 
proscribes it.15  The Posnjak court did, however, allow for the defendant’s 
subjective intent to inform this determination in cases involving component 
parts which have objective characteristics that leave open the possibility of 
conversion into a proscribed or unproscribed device.16 
Finally, in United States v. Johnson,17 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit took a stance largely similar, though not identical to, that of 
 
 5. Id. § 5845(f). 
 6. Spoerke, 568 F.3d at 1247–48. 
 7. See United States v. Posnjak, 457 F.2d 1110, 1119 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 8. Spoerke, 568 F.3d at 1247–48. 
 9. 448 F.2d 892 (9th Cir. 1971). 
 10. Id. at 894.  Subparagraphs (1) and (2) discuss explosive devices and weapons, 
respectively. 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f). 
 11. “Destructive purpose” may be defined as using the item unlawfully or selling it to 
someone who would use it in that manner. See Posnjak, 457 F.2d at 1118; see also United 
States v. Blackwell, 946 F.2d 1049, 1053–54 (4th Cir. 1991) (stating that the malicious 
intent of a third party can suffice to provide the requisite intent of the defendant). 
 12. See Oba, 448 F.2d at 894. 
 13. 457 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 14. See id. at 1120. 
 15. See id. at 1116–18. 
 16. Id. at 1119. 
 17. 152 F.3d 618 (7th Cir. 1998). 
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the Second Circuit.18  It differed from Posnjak only in broadening the scope 
of the exception to the rule that excludes evidence of subjective intent.  
Namely, Johnson allowed for intent to be relevant both in cases of 
unassembled parts and fully assembled devices when the objective 
characteristics of such parts or devices do not compel a conclusion as to the 
legality of the devices’ eventual use.19 
In sum, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion lies on one end of the spectrum, 
permitting a defendant’s subjective intent to carry the day regardless of an 
item’s objective characteristics.20  The Second Circuit sits at the other end 
of the continuum, looking primarily to an item’s objective nature and 
considering subjective intent only when dealing with unassembled parts 
which the defendant could combine to make either an illicit or a lawful 
device.21  The view of the Seventh Circuit—while practically sitting 
somewhere in the middle of the spectrum—is conceptually far closer to that 
of the Second Circuit.  It adopts a similar preference for focusing on an 
item’s objective nature.  It allows, however, for a slightly wider exception 
in allowing a consideration of intent when the characteristics of 
unassembled parts or a fully assembled device do not dictate the purposes 
for which the item will ultimately be used.22 
As there exists a three-way circuit split on this issue, with two of the 
courts (the Second and the Seventh circuits) tendering fairly similar 
opinions, three illustrative hypotheticals may help to properly convey the 
precise stances of the three circuit courts. 
First, consider a case in which all three courts would agree that the 
defendant’s intentions are relevant in determining whether a destructive 
device is present.  For example, a defendant found in possession of empty 
bottles and a can of gasoline may have stated that he intended to use these 
items to make fire bombs and Molotov cocktails to bomb a particular 
location.23  Here, the items at issue are unassembled and could be combined 
to form either an innocuous or a destructive device.24  Accordingly, all 
three courts, even the Second Circuit, would allow for the defendant’s 
intentions to be a “central issue”25 in such a case.26 
 
 18. Id. at 627. 
 19. See id. 
 20. See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text. 
 21. See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text. 
 22. See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text.  One may alternatively approach this 
split through the following set of questions:  first, do an item’s objective characteristics point 
to its inclusion or exclusion under the National Firearms Act?  If so, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit may consider the defendant’s intentions, but the Second and 
Seventh would not.  If not, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (and surely the 
Ninth) would allow for such a consideration.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, however, would then ask whether the item in question consisted of unassembled 
component parts or was a fully assembled device.  If it is the former, the court may consider 
intent to be relevant; if the latter, it may not. 
 23. This hypothetical is based on the facts of United States v. Davis, 313 F. Supp. 710 
(D. Conn. 1970), a case referenced by the Posnjak court as one in which the defendant’s 
subjective intent was “a central issue.”  Posnjak, 457 F.2d at 1119. 
 24. See Posnjak, 457 F.2d at 1119. 
 25. See id. 
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The next case would involve a fully assembled device for which an 
objective inquiry is not dispositive in determining whether the device is 
statutorily destructive.27  Here, the Second Circuit would hold that 
subjective intent is not relevant, since this is not a case of unassembled 
parts.28  The Seventh and Ninth circuits, however, would hold that the court 
may consider the defendant’s intent in determining whether the device is a 
statutorily destructive one. 
Finally, there is the case where a defendant possessed commercial 
dynamite and professed his intentions to use it for harm.  In these cases, the 
item lacks the objectively “destructive” characteristics;29 accordingly, the 
Second and Seventh Circuits would exclude evidence of the defendant’s 
intentions from their determinations of destructiveness.  The Ninth Circuit, 
however, would allow the defendant’s intent alone to render the item 
destructive, thereby placing it within the statute’s reach. 
Though the cases that produced this circuit split are decades old, this 
issue has immediate relevance for several reasons.  Perhaps most obvious is 
the ease with which one can obtain both the materials and information 
needed to construct a destructive device.  A recent Google search for 
“destructive devices for sale” returned over 75,000 hits.30  A similar search 
for “how to build a homemade bomb” produced 575,000 results.31  The 
advent of BlackBerrys and smartphones have rendered the internet an 
increasingly powerful tool for obtaining and utilizing potentially dangerous 
information and materials.  Accordingly, defining an accurate and effective 
legal standard in cases involving destructive devices is a critically important 
endeavor. 
Also relevant is the recently proposed Firearm Licensing and Record of 
Sale Act of 2009.32  This bill seeks to amend certain parts of the U.S. Code 
 
 26. Each circuit court, regardless of its stance on the import of intent in more niche 
scenarios, would be bound by the statute to consider intent in this case. See 26 U.S.C. 
§ 5845(f)(3) (2006) (including within the statute “any combination of parts . . . intended for 
use in converting any device into a destructive device as defined in subparagraphs (1) and 
(2) and from which a destructive device may be readily assembled”) 
 27. The device at issue in Spoerke, a fully assembled one which could be used for 
destructive or nondestructive purposes, would likely fall under this category. See supra 
note 4. 
 28. According to the Second Circuit, therefore, possession of such an item would not 
result in a violation of § 5845. 
 29. Senator Thomas Dodd, the spearhead for the relevant gun control legislation of the 
1960s, stated that he intended to “specifically exclude[]” from the statute’s reach items such 
as commercial dynamite. 114 CONG. REC. 12448 (1968). 
 30. Destructive Devices for Sale, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/
#hl=en&source=hp&q=destructive+devices+for+sale&aq=0&aqi=g2&oq=destructive+devic
es+&fp=cbc2f75bf9d43a8f (last visited Oct. 23, 2010). 
 31. How to Build a Homemade Bomb, GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com/#hl=en&source=hp&q=how+to+build+a+homemeade+bomb&aq=f
&aqi=&oq=&fp=cbc2f75bf9d43a8fUS:official&client=firefox-a (last visited Oct. 23, 2010). 
 32. H.R. 45, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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related to the present discussion.33  Moreover, the professed purposes of the 
bill invoke the same public safety issues which underlie this issue.34 
Lastly, but perhaps most significantly, is President Barack Obama’s 
recent withdrawal of American troops from Iraq in August of 201035 and 
similar plans to exit Afghanistan by the end of 2011.36  Much of the initial 
gun control legislation discussed in this Note targeted the increase in 
imported firearms, many of which were post-World War I surplus,37 and 
one may surmise that these military withdrawals will yield a similar 
surplus. 
Part I.A of this Note discusses the development and legislative history of 
the National Firearms Act and other relevant legislation.  Part I.B considers 
generally the role of mens rea in National Firearms Act cases. 
Part II of this Note expounds on the aforementioned split between the 
Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.  Part II.A.1 discusses the rationale 
proffered by the Ninth Circuit, while Part II.A.2 presents other cases which 
comport conceptually with the Ninth Circuit’s stance.  Parts II.B and II.C 
follow identical structures for the Second and Seventh Circuits, 
respectively. 
Part III argues that the approach adopted by the Second Circuit is most 
consistent with the wording of the statute as well as its legislative history, 
both of which indicate a preference toward limiting the statute’s scope and 
excluding from it items with potentially lawful uses.  It further argues that 
the Second Circuit’s stance is more logical than those of the other two 
circuit courts. 
 
 33. See id. 
 34. One such purpose is “to restrict the availability of qualifying firearms to criminals, 
youths, and other persons prohibited by Federal law from receiving firearms.” Id. § 2(c)(3).  
Another is “to protect the public against the unreasonable risk of injury and death associated 
with the unrecorded sale or transfer of qualifying firearms to criminals and youth.” Id. 
§ 2(c)(1). 
 35. Facts and Figures on Drawdown in Iraq, THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS 
SECRETARY (August 2, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/facts-and-figures-
drawdown-iraq. 
 36. President Barack Obama, Address at United States Military Academy at West Point, 
New York (Dec. 1, 2009). 
 37. See William J. Vizzard, The Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 
79 (1999); see also infra notes 79–86 and accompanying text. See generally Franklin E. 
Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law:  The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 133, 
135 (1975). 
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I.  LAYING THE FOUNDATION:  A GENERAL HISTORY OF FEDERAL 
FIREARMS REGULATION AND THE ROLE OF MENS REA IN NATIONAL 
FIREARMS ACT CASES 
A.  The Development of Early Federal Firearms Regulation 
Many of the cases which this Note discusses give considerable attention 
to the legislative history of the National Firearms Act.38  Accordingly, a 
discussion of this legislative history is critical for grasping the arguments 
proffered by the circuit courts.  Moreover, this Note’s conclusion invokes 
much of this legislative history in developing its rationale.  Consequently, 
Part I.A of this Note traces the legislative development of the National 
Firearms Act.  Part I.A.1 discusses the original National Firearms Act of 
1934, while Part I.A.2 focuses on the passage of the Gun Control Act of 
1968, which amended the 1934 Act.  Part I.A.3 then discusses the structure 
and professed purposes of the amended National Firearms Act. 
1.  The 1934 National Firearms Act’s Historical Background and 
Legislative History 
State and local attempts to regulate firearms date back to the early 
nineteenth century.39  Substantial legislative activity occurred between 1880 
and 1915, but due to a lack of external pressure, the federal government 
made no attempts at regulation.40  The first federal action pertaining to gun 
control was a federal excise tax on firearms and ammunition,41 first 
imposed in 1919.42 
Following World War I, concern with urban crime and handgun use 
began to develop, producing further local firearms regulation and fueling 
the fires of debate regarding federal regulation.43  In 1927, Congress passed 
the Mailing of Firearms Act,44 prohibiting the sale of firearms through the 
mail.45  Though this legislative activity seems to evince a particular concern 
for gun control, there is little evidence that this was a visible public issue at 
the time.46  Rather, the main public concern was curtailing crime and 
 
 38. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 885 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. 
Peterson, 475 F.2d 806, 811 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Oba, 448 F.2d 892, 900–01 
(9th Cir. 1971). 
 39. Zimring, supra note 37, at 135. 
 40. Id. 
 41. I.R.C. § 4181 (2006). 
 42. ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL 103 (Chatham House Publishers, 
2d ed. 1998).  Though this tax was primarily fiscally motivated, its legislative history does 
imply a concern for gun regulation. See Zimring, supra note 37, at 135. 
 43. Zimring, supra note 37, at 135. 
 44. 18 U.S.C. § 1715 (1927). 
 45. See id.  This prohibition’s general ineffectiveness eventually culminated in the 1968 
Gun Control Act’s near-total ban on transactions of this sort. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–31; 
Zimring, supra note 37, at 136. 
 46. See Zimring, supra note 37, at 136. 
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incarcerating criminals.47  The general public viewed firearm regulation as 
one small component of the much larger issue of crime.48 
By the early 1930s gangsterism had become a prevalent problem in 
America.49  Public concern had shifted to the “machine-gun-toting 
interstate gangster personified by John Dillinger.”50  The submachine gun 
had taken on a prominent role in the public eye and had become “a natural 
candidate for public fear and legislative wrath.”51 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first Attorney General, Homer 
Cummings, blazed the path of gun control legislation.52  His efforts 
culminated in two pieces of federal legislation, the National Firearms Act of 
1934 (the National Act)53 and the Federal Firearms Act of 1938 (the 
Federal Act),54 both of which served to establish a federal role in firearms 
regulation.55 
The National Firearms Act regulated civilian ownership of numerous 
devices that had gained reputations as gangster weapons.56  Its form derived 
from the Harrison Narcotics Act,57 and the source of its power was the tax it 
imposed on traffic in weapons.58  The National Act was not intended to be 
an outright ban on firearms.59  For fear that the U.S. Supreme Court would 
strike down such a ban as unconstitutional, Congress took a narrower 
approach, opting instead to merely require registration of certain firearms.60 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. SPITZER, supra note 42, at 104. 
 50. Zimring, supra note 37, at 137. 
 51. Id. at 137. 
 52. Id. at 138. 
 53. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801–5872 (2006). 
 54. Pub. L. No. 75-850, 52 Stat. 1250 (2006). 
 55. These acts also laid the groundwork for the Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 
90-618, 82 Stat. 1213. 
 56. Zimring, supra note 37, at 138.  The National Firearms Act served as a forerunner to 
the Gun Control Act in two significant ways.  It put the government in the business of 
overseeing firearms licensing and manufacturing, and it used the taxing power to center 
enforcement responsibility in the Department of the Treasury. Id. at 139. 
 57. Pub. L. No. 223, 38 Stat. 785 (1914). 
 58. Zimring, supra note 37, at 138.  This also explains why the Act is located in the 
Internal Revenue Code. Martin Lefevour, 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) Requires Mens Rea as to the 
Physical Characteristics of the Weapon, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1136, 1138 n.17 
(1995). 
 59. David T. Hardy, The Firearms Owners’ Protection Act:  A Historical and Legal 
Perspective, 17 CUMB. L. REV. 585, 590–91 (1987). 
 60. Id. at 592 n.34.  Attorney General Homer Cummings’s specific concern was the 
Act’s lack of connection with revenue or interstate commerce.  National Firearms Act:  
Hearings on H.R. 9066 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 73d Cong. 6 (1934).  
This fact affected Congress’s decision to model the Act after the Harrison Narcotic Act, Pub. 
L. No. 223, 38 Stat. 785 (1914), which had already been upheld as constitutional. See United 
States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 94–95 (1919); Hearings on H.R. 9066 Before the Comm. on 
Ways and Means, 73d Cong. 4, 6 (1934) (statement of Attorney General Cummings); Hardy, 
supra note 59, at 591; see also United States v. Homa, 441 F. Supp. 330, 332 (D. Colo. 
1977) (“What must be registered [under the National Firearms Act] are those devices which 
are of such a nature that they are inherently inimical to the public safety if they are freely 
possessed by private persons in an open society.”). 
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Records indicate that the Act was fairly effective; there were fewer 
incidents involving submachine guns after its passage than there were prior 
to it.61  However, the available data to support this conclusion is limited.62  
Moreover, it is possible that the use of these weapons reached an unnatural 
peak right before the Act’s passage and would have abated even without 
it.63 
The Federal Act, Attorney General Cummings’s other major legislative 
effort, served to “spread a thin coat of regulation over all firearms and many 
classes of ammunition suitable for handguns.”64  The Federal Act aimed to 
prevent what was widely considered society’s “criminal class” from 
obtaining firearms, but was generally ineffective in accomplishing its 
professed goals.65  Two loopholes in the Federal Act are particularly salient 
as they eventually determined the shape of the Gun Control Act.66  One was 
the relative ease with which citizens could obtain dealer’s licenses.67  The 
other was the ability for citizens who lived in a state which required 
licenses to simply purchase firearms in a state with no license 
requirement.68 
Further hindering the Act’s effectiveness was the minimal policing of 
dealer compliance and the lack of a serial number requirement on 
firearms.69  Additionally, dealers continued to enjoy immunity from 
prosecution because they did not have to verify their customers’ eligibility 
to purchase guns.70 
Moreover, the government expended considerably few resources in 
enforcing the newly enacted legislation.71  The statistics paint an 
overwhelmingly clear picture:  in 1938, the government invested a total of 
thirty-five man-years to enforce the two acts.72  Between the late 1930s and 
early 1960s, it made less than one hundred arrests per year on the basis of 
this legislation.73 
Yet despite these practical shortcomings, Congress accomplished much 
of what it wanted with these acts:  “a symbolic denunciation of firearms in 
the hands of criminals . . . [and a] regulatory scheme that did not 
inconvenience the American firearms industry or its customers.”74  After 
Attorney General Cummings’s departure in 1939, attempts to expand the 
existing legislation faded.75  Violent crime rates had been in decline since 
 
 61. Zimring, supra note 37, at 139. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 140. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 140–41. 
 68. Id. at 141. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 142. 
 72. Id. 
 73. SPITZER, supra note 42, at 105. 
 74. Zimring, supra note 37, at 143. 
 75. Id. 
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the mid-1930s, and issues such as war and the post-Depression economic 
recovery occupied much of the public’s attention.76 
Between 1938 and 1957, Congress displayed almost no interest in 
enacting new gun control legislation.77  Most of the attempts at regulation 
of firearms during this period came from the Executive Branch and the 
general public, and were largely unsuccessful.78 
2.  Time for a Change:  The Gun Control Act of 1968 
The first indication that the federal government would further regulate 
firearms came in the mid-1950s.79  Inexpensive imported firearms, mostly 
military surplus, began to enter the American firearms market.80  Between 
1955 and 1958, the number of imported rifles available for domestic sale 
rose from 15,000 to 200,000.81  In response, then-Senator John F. Kennedy 
proposed legislation to curb the importation of surplus military weapons.82  
Congress’s ban, however, only reached previously exported military 
firearms.83  Fueled largely by surplus World War II firearms, the flood of 
imported guns continued.84 
Once again, the statistics are extremely compelling:  1955 brought about 
the import for sale of 67,000 handguns to American civilians.85  This figure 
rose to 130,000 in 1959, 500,000 in 1966, and 1,000,000 by 1968.86  This 
dramatic increase notwithstanding, the imported handgun was particularly 
vulnerable to legislative regulation.87  The imported handgun was cheap 
and thus widely available, not used for sport or law enforcement—and thus 
had no redeeming social value—and its importers had far less political sway 
than did domestic gun manufacturers.88 
Perhaps the most influential gun control advocate of this era was Senator 
Thomas Dodd of Connecticut.89  Upon being named Chairman of the 
Juvenile Justice Committee of the Senate Judiciary Center in 1961, Senator 
Dodd ordered a study of mail order sales of firearms.90  Armed with this 
study, Senator Dodd introduced his first gun control bill in 196391 and 
initiated hearings to generate public interest.92  Following the assassination 
of President Kennedy in late 1963, Senator Dodd amended his bill to 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. SPITZER, supra note 42, at 104. 
 79. Zimring, supra note 37, at 144. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. S. 3714, 85th Cong. (1958); see also Vizzard, supra note 37, at 79. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id.; see also supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. 
 85. Zimring, supra note 37, at 144. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 145. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id.  Notably, Connecticut was a major gun-producing state. Id. 
 90. Vizzard, supra note 37, at 80. 
 91. S. 1975, 87th Cong. (1963). 
 92. Vizzard, supra note 37, at 80. 
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include mail order traffic in rifles and shotguns.93  The bill died on the 
Senate floor in 1964.94 
In 1965, following a message sent by President Lyndon B. Johnson that 
requested Congress take an increased role in federal firearms regulation, the 
Treasury staff drafted Senate Bill 1592.95  Truly a predecessor for 
upcoming legislation, the bill contained many of the key elements of the 
Gun Control Act of 1968.96  Senator Dodd introduced a similar bill97 in 
January of 1967.  In response to administration proposals, this bill 
underwent a series of amendments and became known as Amendment 90 to 
Senate Bill 1.98  It extended the prohibition on interstate mail order sales 
and prohibited all interstate transactions between individuals.99  A 
companion bill proposed by Senator Roman Hruska placed destructive 
devices under the National Firearms Act as requiring registration and tax 
payment.100 
Though the bill passed in the Senate less than one month later,101 passage 
in the House of Representatives remained an obstacle.102  The June 5, 1968 
assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy, however, assured House 
passage.103  Surprisingly, this Act never became effective because, in the 
aftermath of Senator Kennedy’s assassination, Congress replaced it with the 
more comprehensive Gun Control Act.104 
The Gun Control Act amended the National Firearms Act to broaden the 
class of restricted items to cover destructive devices.105  It also extended 
interstate restrictions to all firearms and brought ammunition under the Gun 
Control Act’s coverage.106  While Title IV contained the immediately 
relevant section of the Act,107 the rest of the Act was similarly aimed 
towards helping local law enforcement curb incidents of crime.108  To this 
end, the other four sections pertained to crime control means such as law 
 
 93. THOMAS DODD, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES 
SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PURSUANT TO S. RES. 63, S. 
REP. NO. 88-1608 (1968). 
 94. Zimring, supra note 37, at 146. 
 95. Id.  The proposed bill was S. 1592, 89th Cong. (1st Sess. 1965). 
 96. Zimring, supra note 37, at 146. 
 97. S. 1, 90th Cong. (1st Sess. 1967). 
 98. Vizzard, supra note 37, at 82. 
 99. Amend. 90 to S. 1, 90th Cong. (1st Sess. 1967) (as intended to be proposed by Sen. 
Dodd, 1967). 
 100. S. 1854, 90th Cong. (1st Sess. 1967). 
 101. Title IV contained the immediately relevant section of the Act.  Like Title IV, the 
rest of the Act was aimed towards helping local law enforcement curb incidents of crime. S. 
REP. NO. 90-1097, at 1–2 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112.  To this end, the 
other four sections pertained to crime control means such as law enforcement assistance, 
admissibility of confessions, and wiretapping. See id. 
 102. Vizzard, supra note 37, at 83. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968). 
 105. Id; see also H.R. REP. NO. 90-1956, at 14–15 (1968) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1968 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4426. 
 106. Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968). 
 107. See S. REP. NO. 10-1097, at 183 (1968). 
 108. Id. at 30. 
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enforcement assistance, admissibility of confessions, and wiretapping.109  
This was the last major gun control act to pass Congress until the 1986 
Firearms Owners’ Protection Act.110 
3.  A Deeper Look into the Amended National Firearms Act’s Structure and 
Purposes 
The Gun Control Act contains two distinct subdivisions, each located in 
different sections of the federal code.  Title 18 of the United States Code 
contains Title I of the Gun Control Act, which regulates all firearms.111  
Title 26 of the Code contains Title II,112 which incorporates the prior 
National Firearms Act while making minor additions; most notably, the 
inclusion of “destructive devices” within the definition of firearms.113  The 
amended National Firearms Act, though possessing clear criminal 
implications, remained a tax statute; hence its location in the Internal 
Revenue Code.114 
Though clearly curbing the availability of firearms to American citizens, 
the Gun Control Act in fact reflects a compromise between two highly 
polarized camps.115  During the debates preceding the passage of the Act, 
two distinct gun control strategies emerged.116  One was the creation of 
federal jurisdiction and mandatory prison sentences for violent crimes 
committed with guns.117  The proponents of this approach were generally 
the opponents of gun control who were seeking a realistic alternative to 
stricter measures.118  A second approach called for a system of federal 
firearms owner registration or licensing.119  The final version of the Gun 
Control Act contains elements of each, and thus, like the Federal Firearms 
Act of 1938, represents a compromise position between those who 
supported further gun control and those who opposed it.120 
The preamble to the Gun Control Act provides that its purpose is to assist 
in the fight against crime and violence121 without placing any undue 
 
 109. Id. at 213–14. 
 110. Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986). 
 111. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922–30 (2006). 
 112. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801–72. 
 113. Vizzard, supra note 37, at 86. 
 114. Id; see also supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.  The statute’s location in the 
United States Code has practical ramifications pertaining to the extent to which courts apply 
the rule of lenity. See United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 517–18 
(1992). 
 115. See Zimring, supra note 37, at 147. 
 116. See id. 
 117. See id. 
 118. See id. 
 119. See id. 
 120. See id. 
 121. This concern notwithstanding, a National Firearms Act offense centers around the 
possession of a device, not its use, despite the fact that “danger from a pipe bomb comes not 
from the offense of possession, but from the added factor of use.” See United States v. Hull, 
456 F.3d 133, 139 (3d Cir. 2006).  Mere possession of a pipe bomb does not necessarily 
include a substantial risk that the possessor will use it. Id. at 140; see also United States v. 
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burdens on law-abiding citizens.122  These ideals pervade the entire Act123 
as well as the policy discussion which surrounded it.124 
The Gun Control Act contains three specific objectives.125  One is 
assisting local efforts to license, register, and restrict ownership of guns by 
eliminating the interstate traffic in firearms and ammunition.126  A second is 
denying access to firearms to certain groups such as minors and felons.127  
Finally, the Act aims to end the importation of surplus military firearms.128 
Senator Dodd submitted a report in support of the Act129 which further 
illuminated some of its underlying motivations.  Senator Dodd stated that 
destructive devices “are primarily weapons of war which have no 
appropriate use . . . .”130  He further declared as one of the principal 
purposes of the Act a desire to keep firearms out of the hands of those not 
entitled to possess them.131  Yet he clearly delineated that “[i]t is not the 
purpose of the act to place any undue or unnecessary restrictions or burdens 
on responsible law-abiding citizens with respect to . . . any . . . lawful 
activity.”132 
Senator Dodd also discussed the grave implications of Haynes v. United 
States,133 which effectively rendered useless the section of the United States 
Code134 which the government had previously used for National Firearms 
Act prosecutions.135  In Haynes, the defendant pled guilty to possession of 
 
Lane, 252 F.3d 905, 907 (7th Cir. 2001) (distinguishing a crime that increases the likelihood 
of violence from a crime of violence). 
 122. Pub. L. No. 90-618 § 101, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968) (“[T]his title is not intended to 
discourage or eliminate the private ownership or use of firearms by law-abiding citizens for 
lawful purposes . . . .”) 
 123. Vizzard, supra note 37, at 89. 
 124. Id. at 94 (stating that advocates repeatedly discussed the correlation between gun-
related murder and crime rates, as well as that between crime rates and strong gun control 
laws in other countries). 
 125. Zimring, supra note 37, at 149. 
 126. See S. REP. NO. 90-1501, at 23 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4426; H.R. 
REP. NO. 90-1956, at 1 (1968) (Conf. Rep.); see also Zimring, supra note 37, at 149. 
 127. See S. REP. NO. 90-1501, at 23; Zimring, supra note 37, at 149. 
 128. See S. REP. NO. 90-1501, at 24; Zimring, supra note 37, at 149. 
 129. S. REP NO. 90-1501. 
 130. Id. at 1. Notably, Senator Dodd used this fact as a justification for regulation of 
destructive devices. Id. at 28 (“[D]estructive devices . . . are primarily weapons of war and 
have no appropriate sporting use . . . therefore, it is necessary to control all commerce in 
them.”). 
 131. Id. at 22. 
 132. Id.; see also Jay M. Zitter, Validity, Construction, and Application of Provisions of 
National Firearms Act (26 U.S.C.S. § 5845(f)) and Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act (18 U.S.C.S. § 921(a)(4)) Defining “Destructive Device”, 126 A.L.R. FED. 597 (1995). 
 133. 390 U.S. 85 (1968). 
 134. 26 U.S.C. § 5851 (2006). 
 135. S. REP. NO. 90-1501, at 26; see also 114 CONG. REC. 26715–17 (Sep. 12, 1968) 
(remarks of Sen. Dodd) (noting the inadequacy of former gun control regulation); H.R. REP. 
NO. 90-1577, at 7 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4426 (“The subject legislation 
responds to widespread national concern that existing Federal control over the sale and 
shipment of firearms [across] State lines is grossly inadequate.”); SPITZER, supra note 42, at 
105 (noting that between the 1930s and 1960s, fewer than one hundred arrests per year were 
made based on such legislation). 
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unregistered firearms under sections 5841 and 5851.136  The Supreme Court 
found that these sections’ firearms registration requirements were “directed 
principally at those persons who have obtained possession of a firearm 
without complying with the Act’s other requirements.”137  It noted that the 
requirement to register violations under sections 5841 and 5851 greatly 
increased the likelihood of prosecution.138  The Court therefore concluded 
that “a proper claim of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination 
provides a full defense to prosecutions” under sections 5841 and 5851.139  
Part of the Gun Control Act’s purpose was to overcome the Haynes 
obstacle.140 
Congress also explicitly discussed destructive devices.  Senator Roman 
Hruska noted that one of the major effects of the legislation would be 
placing destructive devices within the definition of firearms.141  Senator 
Dodd stated that there was no apparent rationale for precluding such 
devices from the National Firearms Act’s definition.142  He proceeded to 
state that while he did not intend to proscribe legitimate articles of 
commerce, very few legitimate sportsmen own destructive devices such as 
antipersonnel tanks or bazookas.143 
B.  The Role of Mens Rea in National Firearms Act Cases 
As the circuit split speaks to the issue of a defendant’s intent in National 
Firearms Act cases, the next step in properly evaluating the split is an 
analysis of the general mens rea requirement in such prosecutions.144  This 
section lays the groundwork for the later discussion of subjective intent per 
26 U.S.C. § 5845(f).  Moreover, this analysis provides further illumination 
into the congressional motives which prompted the relevant legislation. 
1.  Pre-Staples Cases 
In United States v. Freed,145 the Supreme Court held that the National 
Firearms Act requires no specific intent146 that firearms be unregistered.147  
The only knowledge required for a conviction was that the instrument was a 
 
 136. Haynes, 390 U.S. at 86. 
 137. Id. at 96. 
 138. Id. at 97. 
 139. Id. at 100. 
 140. S. REP. NO. 90-1501, at 26. 
 141. 114 CONG REC. 26900 (1968). 
 142. Id. at 12448. 
 143. Id.; see supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 144. Mens rea is defined as a guilty mind:  “[t]he state of mind that the prosecution, to 
secure a conviction, must prove that a defendant had when committing a crime” BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1075 (9th ed. 2009). 
 145. 401 U.S. 601 (1971). 
 146. Specific intent is the intent to commit the specific criminal act with which one is 
later charged. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 882 (9th. ed. 2009). 
 147. Freed, 401 U.S. at 607; see also United States v. Urban, 140 F.3d 229, 231–34 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (rejecting a specific intent requirement, despite the statute’s reference to “any 
combination of parts either designed or intended for use”). 
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firearm.148  The Court referred to the National Firearms Act as “a 
regulatory measure in the interest of the public safety, which may well be 
premised on the theory that . . . possession of hand grenades is not an 
innocent act.”149 
The Court equated the instant case with United States v. Balint,150 in 
which the Court convicted the defendant of selling narcotics, despite his 
claims that he did not know that a federal act proscribed them.151  There, 
the Court noted that Congress compared the prospect of convicting an 
innocent seller against the evil of exposing innocent citizens to perils of 
drugs, and chose to avoid the latter.152  That the Court invoked this 
reasoning in Freed implies that it viewed the possibility of convicting 
individuals unaware that they are in possession of unregistered firearms as 
insignificant in light of the National Firearms Act’s aim of ensuring public 
safety. 
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. concurred in Freed153 and elucidated the 
majority’s conclusions on this issue.154  To convict a defendant under the 
National Firearms Act, the government must prove three things:  that the 
defendant possessed certain items, that those items were firearms, and that 
the items were unregistered.155  While the last provision requires no proof 
of intent, the first two do have such requirements, thus preventing the 
National Firearms Act from creating a crime of strict liability.156 
Justice Brennan’s comments speak to his opinion on the nature of the 
National Firearms Act.  The Act is intended to cover “major” weapons such 
as sawed-off shotguns and machineguns.157  Justice Brennan viewed the 
likelihood of regulation of these weapons as great enough to obviate the 
intent requirement as per the unregistered status element of the offense.158 
For twelve years after Freed, every federal court which encountered this 
question held that the only mens rea required in this context was that 
defendants had a “general sense” that they possessed a firearm.159  The 
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Herbert160 was the first court to break this 
trend, holding that the government must prove the defendants knew of 
internal characteristics that rendered a device a “firearm” when nothing 
 
 148. Freed, 401 U.S. at 607. 
 149. Id. at 609. 
 150. 258 U.S. 250 (1922). 
 151. See id. 
 152. See id. at 254.  The Balint court felt that when a statute aims to promote public 
welfare, and proving intent would hinder prosecution, the government need not prove that 
defendants knew their activities were illegal. Id. at 252–53. 
 153. Freed, 401 U.S. at 610 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 154. See id. 
 155. See id. at 612. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 616. 
 158. See id. 
 159. Lefevour, supra note 58, at 1140. 
 160. 698 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1983). 
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external would have alerted them to the likelihood of regulation.161  This 
decision precipitated a trend of circuit court splits on this issue.162 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed this issue in 
United States v. Anderson.163  It held that the lack of an explicit mens rea 
requirement in the National Firearms Act does not translate into this 
requirement being disposed of as a precondition for National Firearms Act 
prosecutions.164 
The Anderson court discussed the contrast between the dictionary 
definition of a firearm and that proffered by the National Firearms Act.165  
It noted that there is only a narrow overlap between the colloquial and legal 
definitions of the term.166  The court thus concluded that—in regards to 
devices that look like firearms as per the ordinary meaning of the word but 
not as per the Act, yet are indeed statutory “firearms,”—a conviction 
requires the defendant’s knowledge of the latter.167  Consequently, if a 
defendant is in possession of a non-regulated firearm,168 and unbeknownst 
to him, the weapon was modified or eroded into one which falls under the 
Act, the intent requirement of the Act would not be fulfilled.169 
While the majority’s opinion was largely based on its interpretation of 
Freed, the dissent read Freed as implying that the National Firearms Act 
does not require knowledge of a weapon’s characteristics.170  It argued that 
a possessor’s knowledge “that a grenade is a grenade and is a highly 
dangerous weapon, the possession of which might be unlawful” would 
suffice for a conviction.171  The mere ownership of legal weapons requires 
knowledge of those weapons’ characteristics.172 
Judge Jerry Smith supported his dissent by noting that there are very few, 
if any, National Firearms Act cases which punish a truly “innocent” gun 
owner.173  The Act typically comes into play in cases of gangsters and 
terrorists; as such, Judge Smith deemed the majority’s concern regarding 
 
 161. Id. at 987.  The conviction in Herbert involved weapons which were designed as 
semi-automatic guns and subsequently converted to fully automatic ones. Id. at 983.  The 
National Firearms Act covers fully automatic weapons—which fire multiple shots with only 
one trigger pull—but not semi-automatics. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 602 
n.1 (1994). 
 162. Lefevour, supra note 58, at 1140. 
 163. 885 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 164. Id. at 1253. 
 165. Id. at 1250–51 (noting that the Act’s definition serves to narrow the meaning of 
“firearm” in most respects, but to expand it in some regards as well). 
 166. “[K]nowing or proving that a thing is a firearm in the ordinary sense of the term tells 
almost nothing about whether it is a ‘firearm’ for purposes of the Act . . . .” Id. at 1251. 
 167. Id. 
 168. The court noted that the Act treats “conventionally manufactured” weapons as 
perfectly legal items. Id. at 1254. 
 169. See id. 
 170. Id. at 1256 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 171. Id. at 1257. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 1261. 
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the prosecution of innocent citizens as misplaced.174  Judge Smith also 
noted that the 1986 Firearms Owners’ Protection Act175 added scienter 
requirements to related statutes,176 but did not do so in relation to the 
National Firearms Act.177 
2.  Staples v. United States 
The Supreme Court revisited the intent question in Staples v. United 
States.178  There, the government charged the defendant with the possession 
of an unregistered machinegun179 in violation of section 5861(d) of the 
National Firearms Act.180  Staples claimed that the gun never fired 
automatically in his possession and that he was ignorant of this 
capability.181  He argued that his ignorance should protect him from 
criminal liability for failing to register the gun.182 
The Court noted the statute’s failure to address mens rea.183  Like the 
Anderson majority,184 it refused to interpret this silence as disposing of a 
mens rea requirement.185  It referred to the common law principle that 
requires some level of mens rea for a crime.186  Only in cases involving 
“public welfare” or “regulatory” crimes—a category into which the 
government prosecutors claimed Staples’ conviction fell—may the court 
construe congressional silence as eliminating a mens rea requirement.187 
 
 174. Id. at 1261–62.  The dissent also cited Sipes v. United States, 321 F.2d 174, 176 (8th 
Cir. 1963) which stated that the purpose of firearm regulation was to make it more difficult 
for gangsters to obtain weapons. 
 175. Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986). 
 176. 18 U.S.C. §§ 922, 924 (2006). 
 177. 885 F.2d at 1261 n.7 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 178. 511 U.S. 600 (1994).  Before Staples, there was considerable conflict in federal 
courts on the issue of mens rea in this context. See Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, What 
Constitutes Actual or Constructive Possession of Unregistered or Otherwise Prohibited 
Firearm in Violation of 26 U.S.C.A. § 5861, 133 A.L.R. FED. 347, 366 (1996).  Cases such as 
Freed held that in order to uphold a conviction, the prosecution must merely show that the 
defendant had knowledge that the proscribed item exists, and that it was within his 
possession, but not that it required federal registration.  Many others, meanwhile, held that 
the defendant must at least know of the general nature of the item possessed which places it 
under the statutory definition of a “firearm.” See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 477 F.2d 399, 
401 (8th Cir. 1973).  Still, other courts required knowledge of particular features which 
render the device a statutory “firearm.” See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 959 F.2d 246 (D.C. 
Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Poulos, 895 F.2d 1113 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that a 
conviction requires a defendant to have known that the item was likely to be subject to 
federal regulation). 
 179. The gun in question was a semi-automatic rifle which had been modified for fully 
automatic fire. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 603; supra notes 160–61. 
 180. Staples, 511 U.S. at 603. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 605. 
 184. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 185. Staples, 511 U.S. at 605. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See id. at 606.  In such situations, as long as a defendant knows he is dealing with a 
dangerous device that places him “‘in responsible relation to a public danger,’” he should be 
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The government supported its stance by citing Freed, in which the Court 
referred to the National Firearms Act as “a regulatory measure in the 
interest of the public safety.”188  The Staples Court, however, refused to 
analogize Staples with Freed.189  It stated that the analysis in Freed, a case 
involving hand grenades, was based on the assumption that the defendant 
knew he possessed a dangerous weapon—a weapon within the statutory 
definition of a “firearm,” the possession of which was not innocent.190  In 
Staples, however, “the very question to be decided is whether the defendant 
must know of the particular characteristics that make his weapon a statutory 
firearm.”191 
The Staples Court thus held that it could not analogize the instant case, 
one involving guns, to Freed.192  Rather, it compared Staples to Liparota v. 
United States,193 a case involving the unlawful possession of food 
stamps.194  There, the Court held that the statute required proof that the 
defendant knew his possession of food stamps was unauthorized.195  The 
Court’s decision not to characterize the statute as a public welfare law 
rested on the fact that a “food stamp can hardly be compared to a hand 
grenade.”196 
The Court in Staples held that the same could be said of guns.197  As 
opposed to hand grenades, there is a long history of lawful gun ownership 
in America.198  The crux of the Court’s decision in Freed, that “‘one would 
hardly be surprised to learn that possession of hand grenades is not an 
innocent act,’” could not rightly be extended to Staples.199  This extension 
in the Staples Court’s view, “is simply not supported by common 
experience.”200  The Court stated that unlike grenades, guns can be owned 
in perfect innocence.201  It stated that roughly fifty percent of American 
homes contain at least one firearm.202  In most states, buying a shotgun or 
rifle “would not alert a person to regulation any more than would buying a 
car.”203 
 
“alerted to the probability of strict regulation” Id. at 607 (quoting United States v. 
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943)). 
 188. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971). 
 189. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 609. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See id. at 610. 
 193. 471 U.S. 419 (1985). 
 194. Staples, 511 U.S. at 610. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433. 
 197. Staples, 511 U.S. at 610. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See id (quoting United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971)). 
 200. Id.; see also id. at 621–22 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (stating that the generally 
dangerous nature of guns does not suffice to give defendants cause to inquire about 
registration requirements). 
 201. Id. at 611. 
 202. Id. at 613–14. 
 203. Id. at 614. 
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Turning to the case at hand, the Court concluded that it was reluctant to 
ease the prosecution’s path to conviction of persons such as Staples whose 
conduct would not alert them to the probability of strict regulation under 
section 5861(d).204  It further supported its stance by citing the penalty of 
up to ten years imprisonment attached to such convictions.205  The Court 
relied on the principle that penalties can inform whether a statute should be 
construed as dispensing with mens rea requirements.206  It stated that public 
welfare offenses, which usually carried much lighter penalties, logically 
complement the absence of a mens rea requirement.207  Conversely, 
offenses punishable by long imprisonment generally do require mens rea.208  
The Court thus supported the application of the common law rule favoring a 
mens rea requirement in this case.209 
Justice John Paul Stevens dissented in Staples.  He argued that the 
statute’s text does inform the mens rea issue.210  He argued that the text 
contains no mens rea requirement, nor does it describe a common law 
crime.211  Rather, since the relevant offense was “entirely a creature of 
statute,” the background rules of the common law which the majority cited 
did not apply.212  Justice Stevens concluded that here, congressional silence 
on the mens rea issue dictates that “Congress did not intend to require proof 
that the defendant knew all of the facts that made his conduct illegal.”213 
Justice Stevens further stated that when Congress initially passed the 
statute in 1934, it limited the Act’s coverage to the types of weapons 
characteristically used by gangsters.214  Consequently, Congress could have 
assumed that those possessing such weapons intended to use them for 
criminal purposes; any likelihood of innocent possession was remote.215  
Moreover, the Supreme Court had previously interpreted the Harrison 
Narcotics Act,216 after which the National Firearms Act was modeled,217 
not to require proof of all the facts that constitute an offense in order to 
reach a conviction.218 
Justice Stevens also disagreed with the majority’s contention that the 
National Firearms Act is not a public welfare statute.219  He quoted Freed, 
where the Court held the statute to be a “regulatory measure in the interest 
 
 204. Id. at 615–16. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 617. 
 209. Id. at 619. 
 210. Id. at 625 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens quoted the section of the Act 
which makes it “unlawful for any person . . . to receive or possess a firearm which is not 
registered to him.” Id.(quoting 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (2006). 
 211. Id. 
 212. See id. 
 213. Id. at 626. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 626–27. 
 216. Pub. L. No. 223, 38 Stat. 785 (1914). 
 217. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 218. Staples, 511 U.S. at 626 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 219. Id. at 630. 
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of the public safety.”220  Justice Stevens thus rejected the majority’s “rather 
surprising” and “dubious” conclusion that guns are more analogous to food 
stamps than to hand grenades.221 
Justice Stevens then turned to the history of the National Firearms Act.  
He noted that for the first thirty years of the original Act’s existence, courts 
did not require knowledge of the characteristics of the weapon that brought 
it under the statute’s reach.222  He cited Sipes v. United States,223 in which 
then Judge Harry Blackmun stated that a defendant’s knowledge that he 
possesses a gun is “all the scienter which the statute requires.”224 
Finally, Justice Stevens’s dissent noted that both the 1968 and 1986 
amendments to the Act added knowledge requirements to other sections of 
the statute.225  However, neither the text nor the history of either 
amendment indicates any intent to add such a requirement to the offense for 
possession of an unregistered firearm.226  Justice Stevens thus concluded 
that a finding that a defendant knowingly possessed a dangerous device that 
would alert him to the likelihood of regulation would suffice for a National 
Firearms Act conviction.227 
II.  DOES A DEFENDANT’S SUBJECTIVE INTENT MATTER?  THE THREE-WAY 
CIRCUIT SPLIT 
This part discusses the three subjective intent standards currently applied 
by the circuit courts.  Each subsection first details the cases cited in 
Spoerke228 as giving rise to this split.  The subsections then state arguments 
proffered by other courts which have reached similar conclusions in 
analogous cases.  As many of these cases offer arguments that overlap with 
those of the three primary cases, such arguments are only discussed once. 
A.  Subjective Intent Matters:  Advocating for a Consideration of the 
Defendant’s Intentions 
1.  United States v. Oba 
In 1971, the government charged Richard Oba with possessing and 
transferring an unlawfully made firearm.229  His stated intent was to use 
dynamite to “dynamite the city of Eugene, Oregon and . . . to bomb and 
 
 220. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971); see also supra note 188 and 
accompanying text. 
 221. Staples, 511 U.S. at 631–32 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 222. Id. at 636. 
 223. 321 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1963). 
 224. Id. at 179. 
 225. See Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986); Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 
(1968); Staples, 511 U.S. at 636 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 226. Staples, 511 U.S. at 636. 
 227. Id. at 640. 
 228. United States v. Spoerke, 568 F.3d 1236, 1247–48 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 229. United States v. Oba, 448 F.2d 892 (9th Cir. 1971).  As described in the indictment, 
the object was “seven sticks of dynamite wrapped in copper wire and equipped with fuse and 
blasting caps.” Id. at 894. 
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destroy the property of others.”230  After being charged with violating 26 
U.S.C. § 5861(c) and (e), Oba pled guilty.231  He later appealed his 
conviction, arguing that the object in question was not a “destructive 
device” as per 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f).232 
The Oba court stated that “a device may be ‘converted’ into a destructive 
device as defined in Subparagraphs (1) and (2) by way of ‘design or 
intent.’”233  In light of the characteristics of Oba’s device and its admitted 
purpose, the court said it would be “absurd” to question its qualification as 
a destructive device.234  Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant’s 
intent weighs heavily in the determination of whether a device is a 
“destructive device” under the National Firearms Act.235 
2.  Additional Cases Advocating a Subjective Standard 
In United States v. Peterson,236 the district court convicted the defendants 
of possessing a destructive device under section 5845(f).237  The defendants 
stated that this device could be used for destroying haystacks, and provided 
a list of haystacks they intended to burn and the route they intended to take 
in doing so.238 
Basing its conclusions on the National Firearms Act’s legislative history, 
the Peterson court stated that “Congress was well aware of the rampant 
destruction of property and dangers to life and limb faced by the public 
through . . . homemade instruments.”239  Therefore, the court felt that 
Congress intended to proscribe devices other than military type ordinance 
through its inclusion of “destructive devices” in the statute.240  The court 
noted that the explicit mention of a category of “similar” devices in addition 
to the items specifically named in subparagraph (1)(a)–(f) indicates that 
incendiary “destructive devices” are not limited to military weaponry.241 
That the statute’s wording and legislative history allow for the inclusion 
of homemade devices provided a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for 
 
 230. Id. at 894. 
 231. Id. at 893. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. at 894. 
 234. Id.  Consequently, the court upheld Oba’s conviction. Id. at 895. 
 235. See id. at 894–95. 
 236. 475 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1973). 
 237. Id. at 807.  The device in question was a “three to four inch long casing and fuel 
segment of a fusee flare . . . from which a portion of the fuel material inside the casing 
segment was removed.  The removed fuel material was mixed with an equal amount of gun 
powder.”  This was inserted, along with a piece of cotton rope, into the casing.  An explosive 
expert with the Treasury Department stated that this device was “highly effective” for use in 
destruction of property, and compared it to a Molotov cocktail. Id. at 809. 
 238. Id. at 809. 
 239. Id. at 810. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 810–11. Contra United States v. Posnjak, 457 F.2d 1110, 1116 (2d Cir. 1972) 
(stating that “[t]he last phrase must logically be taken to mean devices similar to the 
preceding enumerated items in that they are articles of military ordinance, not merely that 
they . . . are products with some explosive power”). 
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upholding Peterson’s conviction.  The court stated, however, that “Congress 
manifestly intended to proscribe friendly things when with evil intent they 
are combined or joined together to produce a hostile object or device.”242  It 
concluded that this was precisely what Peterson did.243  Consistent with its 
holding in Oba, the Ninth Circuit held that the nature of the device in 
question, coupled with the defendant’s “evil intent,” rendered the device 
“destructive” for purposes of the National Firearms Act.244 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in United 
States v. Morningstar245 also supports a subjective intent inquiry.  There, 
the prosecution charged the defendant with possession of a destructive 
device in violation of the National Firearms Act.246  The district court held 
that this device was not a destructive one for the purposes of the Act.247  
The circuit court disagreed, holding that the defendant’s intention was 
critical in answering the question of whether commercial explosives are 
covered by the Act.248  The court analyzed the third subsection of section 
5845(f) in reaching this conclusion.249  It first mentioned the statute’s 
design provision250 and noted that it serves to proscribe items such as 
“unassembled parts of a military fragmentation or incendiary bomb,” 
regardless of their intended use.251 
The court noted that, had Congress wished to completely exclude 
commercial explosives from the Act’s reach, it could have stopped at this 
point.252  Yet Congress went on to include combinations of parts “intended 
for use in converting any device into a destructive device.”253  According to 
the court, this provision compels two conclusions.  First, Congress intended 
to proscribe more than just gangster-type weapons and military 
ordinance.254  Moreover, it dictates that for items falling under the intent 
provision, as opposed to those proscribed under the design provision, “the 
use for which these materials are intended determines whether they fall 
within the Act.”255 
The Morningstar court furthered its stance by referring to the Act’s 
legislative history.256  It cited a House Report which stated that “this 
paragraph excludes certain devices from the definition of ‘destructive 
 
 242. Peterson, 475 F.2d at 811. 
 243. Id. 
 244. See id. 
 245. 456 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1972). 
 246. Id. at 279.  The device consisted of “black powder pellet explosive and blasting 
caps.” Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 280 (stating that this issue “must be determined” by the defendant’s 
intentions). 
 249. Id. 
 250. “[A]ny combination of parts . . . designed . . . for use in converting any device into a 
destructive device . . . .”  26 U.S.C. § 5845(f)(3) (1968). 
 251. Morningstar, 456 F.2d at 280. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f)(3) (1968)). 
 254. Id. at 280–81. 
 255. Id. at 280. 
 256. Id. at 281. 
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device.’  The devices excluded are those not designed or redesigned or used 
or intended for use as a weapon—e.g., construction tools using explosives 
when used for such purposes.”257  Thus, the relevant legislative history also 
establishes that the purpose for which destructive devices are used may 
determine whether they are covered by the National Firearms Act.258 
In United States v. Hammond,259 a case from the Eleventh Circuit, the 
government charged the defendant with making an unregistered firearm.260  
After the jury returned a guilty verdict, the defendant moved for a judgment 
of acquittal.261  The district court granted the motion, stating that the 
evidence was inadequate to prove that the item was a “destructive device” 
under section 5845.262 
The Eleventh Circuit stated that a device is not covered by the statute 
simply because it explodes.263  Rather, the court noted a distinct “plus 
factor;” namely, proof that the device was designed as a weapon.264  A 
device is statutorily destructive only if it was designed for use as a 
weapon.265 
It thus appears that the Eleventh Circuit advocates a stance which looks 
beyond a device’s objective characteristics and considers a defendant’s 
subjective intent.  Concededly, the Hammond court’s opinion centered on 
section 5845(f)(3)’s exemption of items not designed for use as a 
weapon;266 thus, its context is not identical to that of the other cases which 
focus on the statute’s inclusionary clauses.267  Nonetheless, Hammond 
repeatedly refers to a “plus factor” which entails looking beyond an item’s 
objective characteristics.268 
B.  The (Primarily) Objective Standard, with a Small Caveat 
1.  United States v. Posnjak 
In 1969, Walter Posnjak contacted an undercover federal agent about the 
possibility of selling dynamite.269  The agent informed Posnjak that he was 
buying the dynamite on behalf of a Cuban revolutionary group which 
 
 257. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1577 (1968)). 
 258. See Morningstar, 456 F.2d at 280–81. 
 259. 371 F.3d 776 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 260. Id. at 778.  The firearm in question was a cardboard tube filled with pyrodex, an 
explosive powder, ground pyrodex, and gunpowder, with a fuse running from one end to the 
center of the device. Id. 
 261. Id. at 779. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at 780. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. (“[T]he statute . . . excludes from coverage any explosive device not designed for 
use as a weapon.”). 
 267. Specifically, “design” will likely pertain to the mindset of the item’s maker, while 
“intent” will likely relate to that of the possessor. 
 268. Hammond, 371 F.3d at 780. 
 269. United States v. Posnjak, 457 F.2d 1110, 1112 (2d Cir. 1972). 
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intended to use it to “blow up buildings and people.”270  Over the next 
several days, Posnjak and his co-defendant sold 4100 unregistered sticks of 
dynamite, along with fuse and caps, to the agent.271 
The trial court instructed the jury to look at “the intent, the purpose, the 
design of the defendant,” adding that a finding that the device was intended 
for use as a bomb or other explosive would place it under the statutory 
definition of destructive device.272  The jury found the defendants guilty on 
all counts.273  Posnjak appealed, arguing that the statute does not proscribe 
commercial dynamite, regardless of the dynamite’s purpose.274 
The Second Circuit concluded that a defendant’s subjective intent could 
not render “destructive” a device that otherwise would not fall under 26 
U.S.C. § 5845(f).275  It based its decision on the statutory language and 
legislative history of the 1934 National Firearms Act and Gun Control Act 
of 1968.276 
The court inferred that the relevant provisions of the National Firearms 
Act “focus on the particularly dangerous weapons subject to special rules 
under the Gun Control Act.”277  It noted that section 5845(f)(1) lists several 
military-type devices, and then adds “similar devices.”278  The logical 
inference, the court noted, is that these other devices must not only be 
similar in their explosiveness, but must be articles of military ordinance as 
well.279 
The court then addressed the government’s argument that 26 U.S.C. 
§ 5845(f) proscribes commercial dynamite.280  It held that though that 
section includes combinations “of parts designed or intended for use in 
converting any device into a destructive device as defined in the earlier two 
subparagraphs and from which such a device may be readily assembled,” 
this section may not broaden the group of proscribed devices.281  The 
components may only be subject to the law if the assembled device would 
be subject to it; this subparagraph “merely precludes evasion through 
possession of the unassembled components instead of the assembled 
item.”282 
 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. at 1112–13. 
 273. Id. at 1113. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. at 1120.  Accordingly, the court reversed the defendants’ conviction, as it was 
based upon the sale of commercial dynamite, which otherwise does not fall under the statute. 
Id. at 1116, 1121. 
 276. Id. at 1113. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. at 1116. 
 279. Id. Contra United States v. Peterson, 475 F.2d 806, 810 (9th Cir. 1973) (noting that 
Congress intended to proscribe military weapons as well as the "do-it-yourself type of 
similar devices").  
 280. Posnjak, 457 F.2d at 1116. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id.  Moreover, subparagraph (3) initially covered “any combination of parts . . . for 
use in converting any device into a destructive device.”  The phrase “as defined in 
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Furthermore, the court noted that “[t]he extensive legislative history 
confirms the fact that certain types of guns were the weapons Congress was 
most concerned to reach.”283  Its discussion included an excerpt from an 
exchange between Senators Dodd and Metcalf regarding the definition of 
“destructive device.”284  In this discussion, Senator Dodd stated that the 
provision at hand specifically excluded items that may be used in 
commercial construction or business activities.285  The Posnjak court 
interpreted the legislative history as evincing a congressional concern with 
clearly identifiable weapons which were the main cause of violent crime 
and which had no lawful uses.286  Because these weapons are per se 
dangerous, the intent of those using them is irrelevant.287 
The Second Circuit thus concluded that an otherwise unproscribed item 
may not be transformed into a “destructive device” by way of intent.288  
This would entail impermissibly importing into subparagraph (3) items not 
identified in subparagraphs (1) and (2).289  Moreover, the original version 
of the Gun Control Act excluded from the definition of “destructive device” 
items “neither designed nor redesigned nor used nor intended for use as a 
weapon.”290  That the final version of the Act’s exclusionary clause 
contained a design provision, but not one focused on intent, indicates a 
congressional desire for an objective standard.291 
To further bolster its conclusion, the Posnjak court made two points 
related to statutory interpretation.  First, since the National Firearms Act is 
drafted in technical language,292 it should be construed technically.293  
More generally, “it is a well-established principle that criminal statutes are 
to be narrowly rather than expansively construed, in order to avoid 
subjecting to prosecution any activities and individuals the legislature did 
not mean to expose to liability.”294 
Despite espousing an opinion which favored looking at a device’s 
objective features rather than its user’s subjective intent, the Second Circuit 
noted one significant caveat.  Namely, when dealing with unassembled 
component parts which are capable of conversion into either a device 
 
subparagraphs (1) and (2)” was added to clarify this very point. Id. (citing S. 1854, 90th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967)). 
 283. Posnjak, 457 F.2d at 1115. 
 284. Id. at 1115–16. 
 285. Id.; see supra notes 129–30. 
 286. Posnjak, 457 F.2d at 1116. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. at 1117. 
 289. Id. 
 290. H.R. REP. NO. 90-1577, at 22 (1968). 
 291. Posnjak, 457 F.2d at 1117–18; see also United States v. Dalpiaz, 527 F.2d 548, 551 
(6th Cir. 1975) (holding that when an item, by its objective nature, is excluded from the 
statute under the ‘neither designed nor redesigned’ exception, “for purposes of determining 
whether the device comes within the statutory exclusion, [the defendant’s] purpose is 
irrelevant”). 
 292. Posnjak, 457 F.2d at 1118 (citing United States v. Collier, 381 F.2d 616, 618–19 
(6th Cir. 1967). 
 293. Id. at 1118 (citing United States v. Lamb, 294 F. Supp. 419 (E.D. Tenn. 1968)). 
 294. Id. at 1118; United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971)). 
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covered by the statute or one not covered, intent may be important.295  
Posnjak itself, however, was not one such case because no combination of 
the components in question could have rendered a device discussed in 
subparagraphs (1) or (2).296 
2.  Additional Cases Adopting the Posnjak Standard 
Judge Browning’s dissenting opinion in Oba bears a striking resemblance 
to the Second Circuit’s holding in Posnjak.297  In his opinion, Judge 
Browning cites United States v. Schofer,298 in which the court held that the 
statute was not intended to reach ordinary materials through intent alone.299 
Like the Posnjak court, Judge Browning relied on both the Act’s 
statutory language and its legislative history in reaching his conclusion.  As 
for the former, he discussed the National Firearms Act’s imposition of taxes 
on firearms, concluding that it is designed to discourage dealing in those 
devices.300  As such, it applies only to two narrow groups of highly 
dangerous weapons worthy of strict regulation.301 
Additionally, prior to the 1968 amendments, the Act was commonly 
known as the “Machine Gun Act.”302  It was intended to reach “carefully 
identified weapons” used by those engaging in illegal activities.303  It was 
only after an influx of surplus military weapons which had no legitimate 
social use and threatened public safety that the Act added to its definition of 
firearms “destructive devices.”304  Committee hearings, committee reports, 
and congressional discourse refer to the destructive devices which the Act 
covers as “military-type weapons,” or “primarily weapons of war,” which 
have no legitimate social use.305 
 
 295. Id. at 1119; see also STEPHEN D. HALBROOK, FIREARMS LAW DESKBOOK § 6:11 
(2010) (stating that the statute refers specifically to a “combination of parts” rather than 
simply “parts;” therefore, the unassembled parts need not even be in proximity to one 
another.  Additionally, raw materials which may form a machine gun do not qualify as a 
“combination of parts” under the statute). 
 296. Posnjak, 457 F.2d at 1120. 
 297. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 298. 310 F. Supp. 1292 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). 
 299. Id. at 1297–98.  The Schofer court equated the potential for conversion into a 
dangerous device with that of a parked car which can be made into “a lethal weapon by 
perversion of its purpose.” Id. at 1297.  The National Firearms Act, however, is aimed at 
“evil articles,” not the evil usage of innocuous ones. Id. But see United States v. Peterson, 
475 F.2d 806, 811 (9th Cir. 1973) (stating that “Congress manifestly intended to proscribe 
friendly things when with evil intent they are combined or joined together to produce a 
hostile object or device through the language used in subsection[] . . . (f)(3)”). 
 300. United States v. Oba, 448 F.2d 892, 896–97 (9th Cir. 1971) (Browning, J., 
dissenting). 
 301. Id. at 897. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. The Act was particularly concerned with making it difficult for gangsters to 
obtain weapons. Id. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id.; see also S. REP. NO. 90-1501, at 28 (1968). 
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Finally, Judge Browning noted the untenable expansion of the Act which 
would result from the majority’s reading of it.306  Such a reading, he 
argued, would “bring within the Act any combination of parts which, 
“‘when combined . . . could have been used destructively.’”307  More 
specifically, a miner or lumberjack who used dynamite in his normal course 
of business would have to register those devices and pay the appropriate 
taxes under section 5845(f).308  In light of the above, as well as other 
arguments previously discussed in Part I.A.1, Judge Browning concluded 
that the National Firearms Act was not intended to reach ordinary 
commercial blasting materials such as those at issue in Oba.309 
In United States v. Fredman,310 the defendant appealed  a conviction of 
possession of unregistered firearms in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d).311  
Here, the court considered specifically the issue of commercial dynamite.312  
It held that commercial dynamite, absent some proof of intent for use as a 
weapon, cannot qualify as a destructive device under section 5845(f).313  
Thus, the court must produce some proof of intent to establish that such 
items are destructive devices.314  The court even went so far as to say that, 
absent proof of design or redesign as a weapon, intent is a “necessary 
element.”315 
The foregoing Fredman analysis appears capable of placing the case in 
the Oba camp, as the Fredman court seemed to afford substantial weight to 
the defendant’s intentions in determining whether the devices at issue were 
statutorily destructive.  Two further points offered by the court in reaching 
its conclusion, however, dictate that Fredman comports with Posnjak’s 
stance. 
First, the court stressed the lack of evidence that the defendants intended 
to use their devices as weapons.316  The court specifically distinguished 
Fredman from cases such as Oba and Peterson, stating that in Fredman, 
“[t]here is simply insufficient evidence . . . to support . . . the conclusion 
 
 306. Oba, 448 F.2d at 901 (Browning, J., dissenting). 
 307. Id.  Such an interpretation would result in the sum of the parts exceeding the whole. 
Id. 
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. at 898.  Namely, the Act's focus on uniquely dangerous weapons, as opposed to 
commonplace items, and the problem of unjustifiably broadening the Act's scope. See supra  
 310. 833 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 311. Id. at 838.  The devices in question were a commercial detonator cord, commercial 
detonator fuses, and commercial igniters. Id. at 837–38. 
 312. Id. at 838–40. 
 313. Id. at 839. But see United States v. Price, 877 F.2d 334, 335–36 (5th Cir. 1989) 
(holding that a homemade device is proscribed even though all of its components may be 
possessed legally); United States v. Wilson, 546 F.2d 1175,1177 (5th Cir. 1977) (clarifying 
that a homemade bomb is proscribed even though its explosive power is derived from 
commercial dynamite); United States v. Curtis, 520 F.2d 1300, 1304 (1st Cir. 1975) (stating 
that a homemade time bomb constitutes a “destructive device” even though its source of 
power was commercial dynamite). 
 314. Fredman, 833 F.2d at 839. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. (“[T]hey were not accompanied by any other indicia of intent to use as a weapon 
. . . .”). 
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that the commercial explosive components . . . were originally ‘designed or 
redesigned for use as a weapon . . . .’”317  This analysis implies that intent is 
relevant specifically because the device’s objective nature did not indicate 
for what type of use the defendant intended it.318 
The Fredman court further distinguished Oba and Peterson on the basis 
of Fredman’s device.  Unlike those in Oba and Peterson, it consisted of 
unassembled component parts.319  That the court explicitly makes this 
distinction in reaching its conclusion implies that the parts’ unassembled 
state was a critical factor in its reasoning.  As the distinguishing 
characteristic between Johnson and Posnjak is that the latter allows for 
subjective intent analysis only in cases of unassembled parts, Fredman 
appears to conform conceptually with the Second Circuit’s view.320 
United States v. Malone321 involved the conviction of a defendant for 
possession of an unregistered firearm under section 5861(d).322  Despite 
possessing materials that could be assembled into a destructive device, 
Malone did not have any explosive material necessary to complete such a  
device.323  The Fifth Circuit held that, although the device had no legitimate 
social use, the defendant could not be found guilty because he did not 
possess all of the parts needed to create a destructive device.324 
Though the Malone court explicitly declined to define what constitutes a 
destructive device, its holding implies an inclination for an objective 
standard.  Namely, Malone’s device had no legitimate social value.  
Accordingly, if the court would have afforded any considerable weight to 
the import of his subjective intent, it may have concluded that the device 
was a statutorily destructive one.  That it refused to do so due to the 
device’s incompleteness implies that it is only a device’s objective 
characteristics, not its possessor’s intentions, that are a significant 
consideration.325 
In United States v. Ragusa,326 the district court convicted the defendant 
for possession of a destructive device under section 5845(f).327  The court 
noted the National Firearms Act’s emphasis on the possession, rather than 
 
 317. Id. at 840 (quoting 26 U.S.C § 5845 (2006)).   
 318. This conclusion runs directly counter to Oba, which seemed to allow for 
consideration of subjective intent even when a device’s objective characteristics may be 
dispositive. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 319. Fredman, 833 F.2d at 839. 
 320. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 321. 546 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 322. Id. at 1183. 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. at 1184; cf. United States v. Simmons, 83 F.3d 686 (4th Cir. 1996).  Simmons 
held that a Molotov cocktail is a destructive device even in the absence of a match needed to 
light it because a Molotov cocktail’s design and purpose is to cause injury or destroy 
property. Id. at 688. 
 325. See also United States v. Markley, 567 F.2d 523, 527 (1st Cir. 1977) (holding that 
devices with no legitimate social uses are “destructive devices” irrespective of their intended 
purpose). 
 326. 664 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1981). 
 327. Id. at 698.  The device in question was a collection of garbage bags holding 
containers of gasoline, and connected by paper towels. Id. at 697. 
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use, of a firearm.328  It interpreted this to suggest that a defendant need not 
use a firearm in a criminal manner to be in violation of the statute.329 
This analysis may be taken one step further.  Logically, possession may 
relate to a device’s objective nature.  Use, on the other hand, pertains to a 
defendant’s subjective intentions with respect to the device.  That the 
Ragusa court held the statute focuses on the former and not the latter330 
indicates that it favored an objective approach. 
Moreover, the court went on to state that although Congress aimed the 
term “destructive device” at proscribing military-type weapons, the phrase 
may also embrace homemade devices.331  The court’s example for the latter 
category was a Molotov cocktail,332 a device which, simply by virtue of its 
objective characteristics, falls within the Act’s reach.333 
In United States v. Urban,334 the government charged the defendant with 
possession of an unregistered destructive device.335  Along with 
instructional books and pamphlets on manufacturing various weapons and 
explosives, Urban possessed such items as an illegal firearm silencer, a 
partially filled container of smokeless gunpowder, a homemade detonator, 
and three fuse assemblies.336  After the district court found Urban guilty, he 
appealed his conviction.337 
The first intimation that Urban supports the Second Circuit’s view stems 
from a somewhat puzzling statement in its opinion.  Immediately after 
citing Oba’s holding that “a device may be ‘converted’ into a destructive 
device as defined in Subparagraphs (1) and (2) by way of ‘design or 
intent,’”338 the court stated that “looking solely at the plain meaning of the 
words used by Congress, a person may be found guilty of a violation of § 
5861(d) if he or she is in possession of a combination of parts.”339  
Presumably, this rules out an adherence to Johnson, which did not 
distinguish between assembled devices and unassembled combinations of 
parts.340 
Particularly in light of its specific mention of Oba, it may seem logical to 
read Urban as supporting the Ninth Circuit’s holding.  Yet a deeper analysis 
 
 328. Id. at 699. 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. 
 332. Id. at 700. 
 333. See, e.g., United States v. Cruz, 492 F.2d 217, 219 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. 
Ross, 458 F.2d 1144, 1145 (5th Cir. 1972).  The Ross court stated that section 5845(f)’s list 
of proscribed devices is descriptive, not exhaustive.  The common denominator of the 
devices listed is usage limited to anti-social purposes; thus, a Molotov cocktail, though not 
mentioned by name, qualifies as a similar device, “as it has no purpose apart from criminal 
activities.” Ross, 458 F.2d at 1145–46. 
 334. 140 F.3d 229 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 335. Id. at 231. 
 336. Id. 
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. at 232 (citing United States v. Oba, 448 F.2d 892, 894 (9th Cir. 1971)). 
 339. Id. The court appears to have gone out of its way to limit a subjective intent inquiry 
to cases involving component parts, even though Oba made no such distinction. 
 340. United States v. Johnson, 152 F.3d 618, 623 (7th Cir. 1998). 
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indicates otherwise.  The court distinguished Urban from Fredman and 
Morningstar on the basis of the lack of ambiguity as to the nature of 
Urban’s device.341  Whereas Oba appeared to allow for a subjective intent 
inquiry even when an objective inquiry may identify whether an item is 
statutorily destructive or not,342 Urban explicitly refused to do so.343  
Finally, the Urban court plainly stated that it agreed with Posnjak’s 
construction of section 5845(f)(3).344 
In United States v. Copus,345 the government charged the defendant with 
manufacturing unregistered destructive devices.346  The authorities found, 
among other items, a number of homemade detonators which the defendant 
stated he used to blow up stumps.347  Appealing to the text of the National 
Firearms Act, Copus argued that there was insufficient evidence to prove 
that he intended to use his detonators as weapons.348 
The court conceded that in the Seventh Circuit, it is “undisputed” that a 
defendant’s intent is relevant in determining whether a combination of parts 
may be labeled a destructive device.349  It noted, however, that Copus’s 
detonators were fully assembled devices.350  It thus applied section 
5845(f)(1), which covers “bomb[s]” or “similar device[s]” and which does 
not contain an intent provision, rather than section 5845(f)(3).351  The 
Copus holding is thus most consistent with Posnjak, allowing for subjective 
intent analysis in cases of component parts, but not when dealing with fully 
assembled devices. 
Copus addressed another relevant question:  assuming subjective intent is 
relevant, what is the extent of its import in yielding a National Firearms Act 
conviction?352  The Copus court, citing United States v. Worstine,353 stated 
that the government is not required to prove the defendant intended to use 
the device as a weapon.354  Rather, “where the objective purpose of a 
device is not clear, the trier of fact may look to the defendant’s subjective 
intent, as one element of the totality of the circumstances, to decide whether 
the device qualifies as a “‘destructive device.’”355 
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This is in stark contrast with the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in United States 
v. Lussier.356  There, the court interpreted Ninth Circuit precedent to dictate 
that if devices fall under the statute’s “combination of parts” subsection, 
“the Government was required to prove either that the devices were 
designed for use, or that Lussier intended to use the devices, ‘in converting 
any device into a destructive device.’”357  The court held that the 
combination of parts subsection “explicitly requires proof” of design or 
intent for use in converting a device into a destructive device.358 
By contrast, the first subsection does not contain an intent provision; a 
court may therefore deem a device “destructive” even in the absence of 
proof of the defendant’s intent.359  Nonetheless, the court stated that while it 
has “sometimes looked to a possessor’s intent” in cases that charge 
defendants under this subsection, a showing of intent is generally a 
necessary component of an action under subsection (C).360  The court 
supported this distinction by stating that “since ‘parts’ are not necessarily 
‘weapons,’ subsection (C) requires a showing of either design or intent to 
‘convert’ the devices into a weapon.”361  By contrast, when dealing with 
devices charged under the first two subsections, there is no dispute that such 
are fully assembled weapons.362  Accordingly, no proof of intent is 
required.363  This line of reasoning provides further logical support for 
Oba’s distinction between assembled devices and component parts. 
C.  The Objective Standard, with a Slightly Larger Caveat 
1.  United States v. Johnson 
In 1996, David Johnson was working at a Shopko store.364  On August 4 
of that year, he directed an assistant store manager to a bag with a 
protruding fuse.365  The police arrived, and upon discovering that the fuse 
ran into a plastic pipe device, they evacuated the store and found another 
similar device.366  Two days later, Johnson agreed to a search of his house, 
which produced several components of the devices found at the store 
including nails, plastic tubing, candles, and a hacksaw.367  Johnson 
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confessed to constructing the devices, but asserted that he did so not to use 
them as weapons, but to “play the hero” in locating them.368 
The district court excluded evidence of Johnson’s subjective intent since 
the devices had objective characteristics which sufficed to bring them under 
the ambit of section 5845(f).369  The jury found him guilty of possession of 
an unlicensed firearm in violation of the National Firearms Act.370 
On appeal, Johnson argued that in cases of component parts, intent is 
relevant because a defendant may possess such parts with or without the 
intention to build a weapon.371  The appellate court’s reasoning centered on 
legislative history and statutory interpretation.  It noted that while the 
legislative history demonstrated a specific concern with commercial 
weapons, courts have read this concern as extending to homemade 
devices.372 
The opinion proceeded to state a critical distinction derived from the 
court’s prior holdings.  Namely, when a device is susceptible only to a 
destructive use, it is automatically proscribed; intent is therefore 
irrelevant.373  When a defendant possesses parts susceptible to either a 
destructive or legitimate use, however, scrutiny into the possessor’s intent is 
necessary.374 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of Johnson’s analysis pertains to the 
extent of this distinction between assembled devices and component parts.  
The court began with the aforementioned conclusion that intent may be 
relevant in cases of component parts.375  It then discussed intent only in the 
context of unassembled parts,376 implying that Johnson adopts Oba’s view.  
The court further stated explicitly that when a device is completely 
assembled, the correct course is to proceed under section 5845 (f)(1),377 
while unassembled parts compel a section 5845 (f)(3) analysis.378  Thus, to 
the extent that an objective inquiry compels either inclusion or exclusion 
under the statute, Johnson seems to agree with Oba’s distinction. 
Johnson proceeded to state, however, that subparagraph (3) covers—
along with unassembled parts—fully assembled parts that are “less clearly 
within the ambit of subpart (1).”379  When “the objective design inquiry is 
not dispositive because the assembled device or unassembled parts may 
form an object with both a legitimate and an illegitimate use, then 
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subjective intent is an appropriate consideration.”380  Thus, whereas 
Posnjak chose to consider subjective intent when an objective inquiry is 
inconclusive only when dealing with unassembled parts, Johnson conflates 
parts and fully assembled devices for the purpose of this analysis. 
In its analysis, the Johnson court invoked the language of section 
5845(f)(3), noting that the words “‘designed’” and “‘intended’” are 
separated by the disjunctive word “‘or.’”381  This suggests that the words 
have separate meanings; accordingly, conversion into a destructive device 
may occur via either the device’s objective design or the defendant’s 
intent.382  The court also cited United States v. Morningstar,383 which stated 
that subparagraph (3) shows that Congress was concerned with more than 
just gangster and military weapons.384 
The Seventh Circuit thus concluded that when the destructive nature of a 
device is obvious, intent is irrelevant.385  When dealing with devices or 
component parts that can serve either a destructive or legitimate purpose, 
however, an intent inquiry is appropriate.386  According to the Johnson 
court, Congress intended for section 5845(f) to “operate in a precise but 
flexible manner.”387  In the instant case, therefore, intent was not relevant, 
as “the objective characteristics of these devices indicated that they were 
useful only as weapons.”388  The court therefore excluded evidence as to 
Johnson’s intent and affirmed his conviction.389 
2.  Additional Case Adopting the Johnson Standard 
In United States v. Tankersley,390 the government charged the defendants 
with possession of a destructive device.391  The prosecution argued that the 
defendants intended on affixing an M-80 to paint remover and exploding 
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them together.392  The defendants maintained that they intended to write on 
the teacher’s car with the paint remover and explode the M-80 
separately.393 
The court began its analysis with the text of section 5845(f).394  After 
quoting the statute, it wrote, “[t]herefore, a combination of certain 
materials, coupled with the requisite intent, can be sufficient to constitute a 
destructive device.”395  That constituted the extent of the court’s analysis in 
connecting its conclusion with the statute’s text396 implies that it understood 
the clear language of the statute to mean that subjective intent can be 
relevant in defining a destructive device. 
The Tankersley court noted the conflict between the Oba and Posnjak 
courts.397  It stated that resolving this split was not necessary, as resort to 
intention was proper under either approach, since this was a case of 
components which could have been converted into either a proscribed or 
unproscribed device.398  Accordingly, an attempt to classify this case under 
the three established standards is inevitably somewhat tenuous. 
Yet the opinion offers some subtle clues as to where on the “subjective 
intent spectrum” it lies.  First, it underplays the significance of the 
indictment’s silence as to whether the device was assembled or not.399  This 
appears to rule out the Second Circuit’s distinction between assembled 
devices and unassembled components. 
Next, the court concluded that “a combination of certain materials, 
coupled with the requisite intent, can be sufficient to constitute a destructive 
device.”400  One may properly infer that, contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s 
view,401 intent alone does not suffice to beget a destructive device.  It thus 
appears that the Tankersley court’s holding supports that of the Seventh 
Circuit in Johnson. 
III.  THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S STANDARD IS MOST CONGRUENT WITH THE 
RELEVANT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, STATUTORY TEXT, AND COMMON 
SENSE 
The opinions of the Oba, Posnjak and Johnson courts—as well as those 
of the other courts discussed above—invoke arguments pertaining to the 
National Firearms Act’s statutory language, its legislative history, and 
notions of common sense in reaching their conclusions.  Part III now 
considers each category of arguments in turn. 
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This Note does not, however, undertake this approach for mere 
conceptual convenience.  Rather, this Note reaches its final conclusion 
through a three-step process.  Part III.A, which discusses the Act’s 
legislative history, serves to eliminate the Ninth Circuit’s approach from 
consideration, while Part III.B, invoking statutory interpretation, primarily 
accomplishes the same for that of the Seventh Circuit.  Part III.C offers 
further support for the Second Circuit’s stance being not only more sound 
based on the legislative history and statutory language than those courts 
discussed above, but standing on its own as the most logical and practically 
favorable approach to the question at hand. 
A.  Legislative History 
Throughout the development of the National Firearms Act, evidence 
abounds as to a specific congressional concern with proscribing objectively 
identifiable weapons to the exclusion of devices whose destructiveness 
depends on their owners’ intentions.  This history runs directly counter to 
the Ninth Circuit’s stance in Oba, where the court stated that a device, 
though in an objective sense not necessarily statutorily destructive, may be 
rendered a “destructive device” by way of the defendant’s subjective 
intent.402  Thus, a review of the Act’s legislative history serves to remove 
the Oba approach from consideration. 
The initial impetus for early gun control legislation was urban crime and 
handgun use,403 and the resulting 1927 legislation specifically targeted 
crime and criminals.404  These motivations pervaded the initial National 
Firearms Act itself as well, as throughout the 1930s Congress committed 
itself to combat the particular issue of gangsterism, which the wide 
availability of machine guns helped to facilitate.405 
The resulting legislation reflected this congressional focus.  The National 
Firearms Act aimed to proscribe those weapons which had gained 
reputations as gangster weapons;406 consequently, it targeted those items 
which were considered “inherently inimical to public safety.”407  Similarly, 
the Federal Firearms Act aimed to prevent a certain “criminal class” from 
obtaining firearms.408  The early gun control legislation’s implications are 
thus clear:  Congress sought to target particular individuals and objectively 
identifiable weapons in its effort to ensure public safety. 
Similar themes also pervaded the second wave of gun control legislation.  
The post-World War II import of military weaponry played a large role in 
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spurring the gun control legislation of the 1960s,409 and the Gun Control 
Act specifically aimed to curb the availability of such weapons.410 
The 1968 amendment’s broader context is telling as well.  Along with its 
inclusion of destructive devices within the definition of firearms,411 
Congress amended the Act to provide for interstate firearms dealing 
regulation412 and to bring ammunition under the Act’s coverage.413  
Congress thus undertook to proscribe destructive devices in conjunction 
with other provisions which point to a broad congressional concern for 
prohibiting crime and outlawing objectively dangerous weapons. 
Moreover, there is explicit reference throughout the Act’s legislative 
history to its primary purposes.  Its preamble provides that the Act was 
meant to aid the fight against crime and violence without placing an “undue 
burden” on America’s law-abiding citizens.414  This statement reflects a 
congressional intention to target specific weapons connected with crime and 
violence, to the exclusion of homemade devices which a possessor may use 
for either legitimate or harmful purposes. 
Judge Browning’s dissent in Oba415 offers one example of an undue 
burden to which a primarily subjective standard would give rise.  He stated 
that under the Oba approach, a miner or a lumberjack who used commercial 
devices legitimately could be required to register those devices, and face 
prosecution for his failure to do so.416 
Additionally, the statute focused particularly on the possession, as 
opposed to the use, of the proscribed items.417  Whereas use requires some 
degree of a defendant’s subjective intentions, possession exists on a solely 
objective plane; a defendant either possesses an item, or he does not.418  
That the statute focuses on the latter suggests its preference for an objective, 
rather than subjective, standard.419 
Perhaps most poignant are the remarks of Senator Thomas Dodd, the 
trailblazer of 1960s gun control legislation.420  Senator Dodd stated that he 
intended the Act to reach “things like hand grenades,” while explicitly 
excluding from its scope “items which would be used in commercial 
construction or business activities.”421 
Thus, throughout the development of both the initial and current 
incarnations of the National Firearms Act, the legislative history evinces a 
clear congressional concern with objectively identifiable items with 
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characteristics that serve to connect these items with illicit activities such as 
gangsterism.  Expanding the reach of this rule to cover additional items 
based merely on a defendant’s intentions, as was suggested by the Ninth 
Circuit in Oba,422 is plainly incongruent with the motivations that underlie 
the Act. 
B.  Statutory Text 
At this point in the analysis, the stances of the Second Circuit in Posnjak 
and the Seventh Circuit in Johnson seem more consistent with the Act’s 
legislative history than does that of the Oba court.  This part of the Note 
primarily discusses notions of statutory interpretation to conclude that 
Posnjak’s reading of section 5845 (f) is more logical than that of the 
Johnson court.  Before doing so, however, several points relating to 
statutory interpretation effectively serve as the death knell for a 
consideration of Oba’s stance. 
The Oba line of cases appears to place the horse before the cart, focusing 
on selective terms within the statute in order to reach their respective 
conclusions.  Peterson does so in its discussion of “similar devices” to 
broaden the Act’s scope,423 while Morningstar does the same in its 
consideration of the statute’s reference of a defendant’s intent.424 
These readings, however, ignore the broader context of the Act which 
allows for such considerations if they will convert a device into a 
destructive device “as defined in subparagraphs (1) and (2) . . . .”425  This 
provision was in fact not even part of the original Act’s wording, and was 
later added to eliminate the possibility of the Act being misconstrued in this 
exact fashion.426  Thus, contrary to the interpretations of these cases, a 
correct reading of the Act does not allow for considerations such as a 
defendant’s intent to broaden the category of devices which the Act 
explicitly covers. 
Additionally, this Note discussed previously the Peterson and Posnjak 
courts’ directly opposing stances on interpreting the statute’s use of the 
phrase “similar devices.”427  The notion of nonscitur a sociis requires a 
court to interpret a general term to be similar to more specific terms in a 
series.428  Relatedly, ejusdem generis calls for an interpretation of a general 
term to reflect the class of objects reflected in more specific terms which 
accompany it.429  Thus, contrary to Peterson’s—and by logical extension, 
Oba’s—contentions, the “similar devices” phrase does not expand the Act’s 
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umbrella to reach items which are not proscribed by it based on the items’ 
objective characteristics. 
In addition to the actual words of the statute, further support for an 
objective approach exists in certain features not contained in the statutory 
wording itself.  One is the fact that the original Act was known as the 
“Machine Gun Act,”430 a moniker that speaks to the Act’s concern for 
weapons of war with no legitimate social use.431  The very existence of the 
question as to whether a defendant will use a device for harm dictates that 
such an item is not one with which Congress was concerned.  The 
subjective intent inquiry should end—not begin—the statutory liability 
analysis. 
Finally, the words which the statute omits may be just as telling as those 
which it contains.  The 1986 Firearms Owners’ Protection Act added 
specific scienter requirements to statutes related to the National Firearms 
Act, but declined to do so for the National Firearms Act itself.432  This 
omission further supports a congressional preference for an objective 
approach when considering National Firearms Act prosecutions. 
Statutory interpretation further supports Posnjak’s preference for 
distinguishing unassembled parts from fully assembled devices, allowing 
for a potential exception to a generally objective approach only in the 
former case.433  As noted by the Posnjak court, courts should construe 
statutes which are written in technical language, such as the National 
Firearms Act, technically.434  Similarly, courts should read criminal 
statutes, such as this, narrowly in order to limit the possibility of 
prosecuting individuals whom the legislature did not intend to subject to 
criminal liability.435 
Two additional canons of statutory construction compel a similar 
conclusion.  First, the plain meaning rule dictates that courts interpret legal 
text according to the text’s plain meaning.436  Additionally, courts should 
not read statutes in a way that would render any of their provisions 
superfluous.437  Reading section 5845(f)(3) to cover either unassembled 
parts or fully assembled devices, as the Johnson court tries to do, is in direct 
violation of both of these principles. 
Regarding the former, the plain meaning of “unassembled parts” is 
unassembled—not fully-assembled—devices.  As for the latter, if both 
categories are to be placed on equal ground, there is no reason for the 
statute to go out of its way to introduce this subsection as referring to a 
“combination of parts.”  These principles of statutory construction thus 
dictate that the phrase “combination of parts” in subparagraph (3) should, as 
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posited by the Posnjak court, pertain exclusively to unassembled 
combinations of parts, and not to fully assembled devices.438 
C.  Additional Support for the Second Circuit’s Stance 
The remainder of this Note offers arguments which, while not necessarily 
based on legislative history or grounded in formal statutory construction 
canons, appeal to common sense in providing additional support for the 
Posnjak approach.  These arguments illustrate that Posnjak not only 
provides a more sound opinion than  Oba or Johnson in a theoretical sense, 
but it also represents the ideal stance for courts to apply in practical 
situations. 
One such argument is based on the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Rule 401 
states that “‘[r]elevant evidence’ means any evidence having a tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence.”439  Rule 402 provides that relevant evidence is generally 
admissible.440 
A thorough analysis of the Federal Rules of Evidence is far beyond the 
scope of this Note.  One may, however, effectively apply the above rules to 
the present issue.  In cases involving unassembled combinations of parts 
whose objective characteristics do not conclusively denote a legitimate or 
harmful use, the defendant’s intent surely falls within the gambit of Rule 
401441  Accordingly, in such cases courts should consider evidence 
pertaining to the defendant’s subjective intent.  This is precisely the 
conclusion for which Posnjak stands. 
Similarly, an adoption of the Johnson opinion, which treats unassembled 
parts and assembled devices equally, overlooks a key point and yields 
flawed conclusions.  The Lussier court observed that “‘parts’ are not 
necessarily ‘weapons.’”442  Parts and devices are categorically, not 
incidentally, different.  One may even argue that assembled devices, by 
their completed nature, inhere a certain degree of intent; there is obviously 
some rhyme or reason underlying these parts being assembled as they are.  
The eventual use of these parts will likely reflect this purpose.  This 
element is lacking in cases of unassembled parts, however; a possessor may 
eventually use such parts for a range of purposes unrelated to the nature of 
the parts themselves. 
Consequently, courts should view the two categories through completely 
different lenses.  Allowing a consideration of intent when dealing with 
assembled devices not only runs counter to the statute’s wording, it may 
even run counter to the essence of the item at hand.  Johnson noted that 
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when an objective inquiry indicates for what purposes an item will be used, 
a court should not consider subjective intent.  It failed, however, to take the 
next logical step in its analysis:  that this is always the case when dealing 
with fully assembled devices. 
Johnson’s failure to recognize this point, and therefore to place parts and 
devices on equal footing, has two potentially fatal results.  One is a direct 
conflict with the court’s own professed interpretation of the statute; the 
second is an overexpansion of the statute’s reach to illegitimate items which 
should not be proscribed. 
None of these obstacles besets Posnjak.  It favors objective inquiries over 
considerations of those of subjective intent and forbids intent analysis 
whenever dealing with assembled devices, an approach which avoids the 
pitfalls which invalidated both Oba and Johnson. 
Revisiting the hypotheticals which Part I of this Note discussed likely 
provides the strongest support for these contentions.  The first hypothetical 
requires little discussion, as all three circuit courts would agree that intent is 
relevant when dealing with a defendant who possessed empty bottles and 
gasoline, and claimed he intended to use those unassembled parts to make 
Molotov cocktails.443 
The next example444 discussed a case involving an item such as that at 
issue in Spoerke, one in which Posnjak would disagree with Oba and 
Johnson.  There, the item was a homemade explosive made of polyvinyl 
chloride pipe capable of propelling shrapnel.445  Here, Posnjak alone would 
hold that intent is not relevant, as the device was fully assembled.446  This 
conclusion appears far more logical than one which considers intent; if a 
person is in possession of a homemade explosive such as this, which is 
capable of propelling shrapnel, it seems incongruent to fail to proscribe it 
outright under a statute which aims to cover destructive devices. 
The final example involved a defendant in possession of commercial 
dynamite which he planned to use for harm.447  Here, Posnjak and Johnson 
would agree that intent should not be relevant, while Oba would hold that it 
is.  Once again, Posnjak is on the correct side of the argument, as the Act’s 
legislative history evinces a clear preference against proscribing 
commercial dynamite.448  Thus, not only is Posnjak the ideal approach in 
theory, comporting most highly with legislative history and statutory 
construction, it is the most logically unassailable approach when applied in 
practical scenarios as well. 
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CONCLUSION 
The question of how much gravity—if any— a court may confer upon a 
defendant’s subjective intent in determining whether that defendant 
possessed a statutorily destructive device is complex and multifaceted.  The 
circuit split which underlies this Note appeals to notions of statutory 
interpretation, legislative history, public safety concerns, and perhaps most 
significantly, a discerning degree of common sense in properly parsing the 
views of the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits on this matter.  Each 
opinion listed above invoked some combination of these and other factors 
in reaching its conclusion. 
In light of all relevant factors and for the reasons set forth in Part III of 
this Note, the most sound approach is that of the Second Circuit in Posnjak, 
advocating a standard which looks primarily to an item’s objective 
characteristics, but allows for consideration of subjective intent, specifically 
in cases of unassembled parts when an objective inquiry leaves open the 
possibilities of conversion into either a proscribed or unproscribed 
device.449  Adherence to Posnjak assures uniformity with legislative intent, 
accuracy in statutory interpretation, and consistency with general notions of 
legality, logic, and public welfare.  Therefore, this standard should prevail 
as courts continue to consider the question of subjective intent in National 
Firearms Act prosecutions. 
 
 
 449. See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text. 
